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ABSTRACT 
Purpose To evaluate the implementation of a broad-scale team resource management (TRM) program on safety culture in a 
Dutch eye hospital, detailing the program’s content and procedures. Aviation-based TRM training is recognized as a useful 
approach to increase patient safety, but little is known about how it affects safety culture.  
 
Design/methodology/approach Pre- and post-assessments of the hospitals’ safety culture was based on interviews with 
ophthalmologists, anaesthesiologists, residents, nurses, and support staff. Interim observations were made at training sessions 
and in daily hospital practice. 
 
Findings The program consisted of safety audits of processes and (team) activities, interactive classroom training sessions by 
aviation experts, a flight simulator session, and video recording of team activities with subsequent feedback. Medical 
professionals considered aviation experts inspiring role models and respected their non-hierarchical external perspective and 
focus on medical-technical issues. The post-assessment showed that ophthalmologists and other hospital staff had become 
increasingly aware of safety issues. The multidisciplinary approach promoted social (team) orientation that replaced the former 
functionally-oriented culture. The number of reported near-incidents greatly increased; the number of wrong-side surgeries 
stabilized to a minimum after an initial substantial reduction.  
 
Research limitations/implications The study was observational and the hospital’s variety of efforts to improve safety culture 
prevented us from establishing a causal relation between improvement and any one specific intervention.  
 
Originality/value Aviation-based TRM training can be a useful to stimulate safety culture in hospitals. Safety and quality 
improvements are not single treatment Interventions but complex socio-technical interventions. A multidisciplinary system 
approach and focus on ‘team’ instead of ‘profession’ seems both necessary and difficult in hospital care. 
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Background 
Studies have shown that too often health care is hazardous rather than beneficial, with unnecessary morbidity and mortality (Kohn et 
al., 1999; Haynes et al., 2009; Leape et al., 2009; Classen et al., 2010). Human factors seem to cause most incidents and failures 
(Reason 1990; Griffin and Neal, 2000; van Dyck, 2000). A study in Dutch hospitals revealed that 56% of unintentional harmful 
events were related to health professionals’ knowledge, behaviour, or skills (De Bruijne et al., 2007). In contrast, technical and 
organizational factors played a minor role at 4% and 14% respectively. The researchers attribute the other 26% to a combination of 
‘others factors’, ‘patient factors’ and ‘not able to evaluate’. Health care managers therefore are urged to focus on patient safety and 
quality while they are simultaneously asked to reduce costs and increase efficiency. Such circumstances are not exclusive to health 
care management. Comparable challenges are found in other industries, some of which have found effective approaches to focus 
on quality in combination with increasing efficiency and client centredness. Many authors have advocated the use of innovations 
from other industries in health care (Berwick 1989; Hudson 2003; Singh et al. 2006; Nance 2008). It is widely believed the 
application of industrial quality and safety methods can result in significant improvement in clinical processes and medical care 
outcomes.  
 
Safety as dimension of quality  
 
Although safety is often dimensioned as being part of the broader ‘quality’ concept (with effectiveness, efficiency, accessibility, 
acceptability, equitability), the last decennium has seen increasing awareness and focus on (patient) safety and some talk about a 
‘new health care discipline’. The Institute of Medicine defined patient safety as ‘the freedom from accidental injury; ensuring patient 
safety involves the establishment of operational systems and processes that minimize the likelihood of errors and maximise the 
likelihood of interceding them when they occur’ (IOM, 1999). And also from ancient history on, the medical world states with 
Hippocrates: Primum non nocere – ‘First, do no harm’. In the last decade, different studies have shown that health care delivery is 
too often hazardous. In Dutch hospitals, about 1,960 patient die annually and 33,000 (2.9% of all inpatients) are harmed due to 
preventable, unnecessary action (Langelaan et al. 2010). The costs of these events are estimated at €161 million, 1 percent of the 
national hospital care budget (Hoonhout et al. 2009).   
 
Hospitals as complex services organizations 
 
Health care comprises a series of activities between a care seeker, the patient, and a care deliverer, in which the care deliverer 
relates his or her performance partly to scientific knowledge to achieve a goal -health, well-being- that will be judged against the 
patient’s own subjective values (Klazinga 1996). Health care can thus be seen as medical practice when applying knowledge, and a 
service delivery when providing a service, which results in specific responsibilities for the medical profession and the hospital 
organization towards quality and safety. 
Like other service industries, hospital care is characterized by an intangible product whose production by the medical 
specialist and consumption by the patient are inseparable. In the interaction of doctor-patient the patient’s question (in the context of 
a health problem and seen as a health care demand) and the doctor’s answer (in the context of medicine and seen as a response to 
a health need) constitute the essence of the production process. The level of autonomy of the provider to make decisions is very 
high: a medical specialist delivers an individualized service in a context of limited possibilities. Quality and safety improvement in 
health care also relates to the organization of the care. All doctor-patient contacts take place within a broader production process of 
service delivery. The production process of specialist care is part of a composite of production process that together results in the 
primary process of patient care within the organisational context of a hospital. Where the physician of yore practiced at home, the 
increasing number of specialists and use of technology since the beginning of the 20
th
 century compelled them to work (partly) in 
hospitals. Hospitals, a century before created as ‘houses of God’ and ‘houses for the poor’, increasingly became institutions where 
‘scientific treatments’ could be obtained that could not be provided at home (Van Lieburg & Richter, 1993). Thus, the modern 
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hospital as a complex service organization providing specialized medical care took shape. Currently, a development to ‘focussed 
factories’ for specific patient groups (e.g. orthopedics, oncology, ophthalmology) is visible, giving rise to discussions about a 
desirable concentration and distribution of general and specialized care (see for example Christensen et al., 2009). These context 
changes need to be taken into account when approaching quality and safety issues in today’s hospital care.   
 
Health care compared to other industries  
 
Notwithstanding the characteristics of health and hospital care, other industries also face negative factors related to organizational 
and professional issues. Some have found approaches to mitigate their effects on quality and safety. Comparing health care safety –
patient safety outcomes, for example – to other industries is difficult because adverse-event reporting – even within the same sector 
– uses different definitions and weighting. For example, civil aviation uses 1 million departures as the relevant volume parameter; 
military aviation uses the number of flight hours. In many industries, the weighting process reflects how comfortable the organization 
or industry is with its risk exposure. For example, there were 661 fatal accidents on Dutch roads in 2011, a number that was 
communicated to the public (Min I&M, 2012). Fatalities are often weighted by travel convenience and the total number of miles 
travelled.   
 Amalberti et al. (2005) have performed risk assessments and compared different industries. They used the rate of 
catastrophic events per exposure among industries with those in health care. Some sectors continue to have low safety levels (e.g. 
transport by a micro light aircraft or helicopter); some are stagnant at average safety levels (e.g. road safety); some are at safe 
levels (e.g. petrochemical industry), and the best have achieved safety levels beyond 10
-6
. Viewed through this lens, accident rates 
in health care currently range from 10
-1
 to 10
-4 
.events per exposure. Due to the number of iatrogenic adverse events hospitals thus 
can be characterized as ‘unsafe’. Different studies found that 14-33% of patients in U.S. hospitals were harmed by medical care, 
with 44-63% of those cases being judged as being preventable (Landrigan, et al. 2010; Levinson, 2010; Classen et al., 2011). 
Assessing the issues retrospectively, many current quality (safety) issues in health care are related to organizational characteristics, 
process complexity, and hospital culture (Leape et al. 2009; Hudson 2003; Sexton et al. 2000; Flin et al. 2008). These issues are, 
however, comparable to (earlier) situations in other industries. 
 
Aviation-based safety team training  
 
To improve human factors issues (e.g. pilot awareness or fatigue), related to safety in aviation, Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
is used to train cockpit crews. CRM can be described as training on non-technical skills of crews which is focussed on increasing 
awareness of safety, its causes and characteristics, improvement of communication, leadership and reflection on one’s own 
behaviour (Pizzi et al., 2001; Powell, 2006). Cockpits crews worldwide are mandatorily trained in CRM. Aviation safety outcomes in 
the US show that between 1994 and 2006, the average rate of fatal accidents decreased from 0.05 to 0.022 per 100,000 departures, 
which led Pronovost et al. (2009) to conclude that ‘health care’s slow disappointing efforts to improve safety contrasts with the 
remarkable success of aviation safety.’ 
CRM training has been suggested to improve human-factor-related healthcare safety (Pizzi et al., 2001; Bleakley et al., 
2004; Musson & Helmreich, 2004; Powell, 2006; Yule et al., 2006; Dunn et al., 2007; Gore et al., 2010; Neily et al., 2010; Oriol, 
2006; Rabøl et al., 2010). CRM is used in aviation for non-technical skills training and focuses on increasing awareness of safety, its 
causes and characteristics, improvement of (team) communication, leadership, and reflecting on individual behaviour (Edmondson, 
2003; Grogan et al., 2004; Flin et al., 2006; Haig et al., 2006; Sexton et al., 2006; Rabøl et al., 2010). In health care, professional 
staff (for example, physicians and nurses) are exposed to the same training concepts (referred to as Team Resource Management 
(TRM) which term we will use from now on) to improve safety culture (Grogan et al., 2004; Rabøl et al., 2010). According to 
McConaughey (2008), the training provides team members with the tools, knowledge, skills and attitudes that they need to respond 
to demanding and difficult situations while minimizing the risks of errors. TRM can include different educational approaches, such as 
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lectures, videos, simulators and on-the-job behaviour feedback. While there are different handbooks, one standardized methodology 
or prescription for ‘the TRM intervention’ does not exist (Bleakley et al. 2004; Fraher, 2005a; ibid. 2005b). Recent studies use 
different names (‘crew resource management’, ‘team resource management’, ‘medical team training’, ‘human factors training’ 
(Edmondson 2003; Neily et al. 2010; Rabøl et al. 2010) and vary widely on content and implementation.  
Although there is no high quality evidence of the effectiveness of TRM, different studies have shown positive results (Buljac 
et al., 2010). For example Neily et al. (2010) found that participation in a Medical Team Training at Veterans Health Administration 
was associated with lower surgical mortality upon evaluation one year post-implementation. A retrospective study with a 
contemporaneous control group was conducted. Outcome data were obtained from a surgical quality improvement program and 
from structured interviews. The analysis included 182,409 sampled procedures from 108 hospitals. The training program included 
2 months of preparation, a 1-day conference, and 1 year of quarterly coaching interviews and required briefings and debriefings 
in the operating room and included checklists. The 74 facilities in the training program experienced an 18% reduction in annual 
mortality (RR 0.82 CI 0.76-0.91, p=.01) compared with a 7% decrease among the 34 facilities that had not yet undergone training 
(RR 0.93 CI 0.80-1.06, p=.59). McCulloch et al. (2009) described the effect of aviation-based training on technical performance 
and outcome in the operating room (OR). They performed an uncontrolled before-after study of the effect of non-technical skills 
training on attitudes, teamwork, technical performance and clinical outcome in laparoscopic cholecystectomy (LC) and carotid 
endarterectomy (CEA) operations in one UK teaching hospital. A 9 hours classroom non-technical skills course was offered to all 
staff, followed by 3 months of twice-weekly coaching from CRM-experts. Non-technical skills (p=0.021) and attitudes (p=0.007) 
improved after the training and operative technical errors (p=0.009) and non-operative procedure errors (p<0.001) declined. They 
concluded that the hypothesis that the OR team could substantially reduce errors and adverse surgical outcomes has become 
widely accepted, but evidence supporting it is scant. Both in aviation and health care, little is  known about how TRM affects the 
‘black box’ of safety culture. A systematic review conducted by Rabøl et al. (2010) showed that more than half the studies ended 
evaluation within six months, but Sax et al. (2009) concluded TRM’s influence on personal behaviour and empowerment may 
take years to be integrated into the culture. 
 Although definitions vary, safety culture is commonly defined as “the product of the individual and group values, attitudes, 
perceptions, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of an 
organization’s health and safety management” (Nieva and Sorra, 2003, pp.ii18). Based on selected literature, the following 
dimensions appear to determine a safety culture and are TRM program focus points (Bogner, 1994; van Dyck, 2000; Nieva and 
Sorra, 2003; Hoffman et al., 2006; Nance, 2008; Singer et al., 2010): 
1. Awareness of risks (anticipation of approaching conditions, acceptance of human factors in safety); 
2. Aversion to report errors (too rigid a focus on prevention, transparency with respect to errors, not 
covering up near misses); 
3. Social orientation (curtailing operator autonomy while preserving operator authority, increasing 
knowledge and skills in communication and helping); 
4. Mastery of risks (reporting errors, correction and analysis of errors, learning from (near) incidents). 
Since it is difficult to measure culture and not much is known on how TRM is applied in practice, a thorough analysis of 
the characteristics of TRM and how it is implemented in practice is needed to assess if and how it affects safety culture. We 
therefore studied the development, implementation, and subsequent experiences of a hospital-wide TRM program in an eye hospital 
in the Netherlands. Staff members (medical, management, support) from all hospital departments involved in patient care 
participated. Our research question was:  “How is an aviation-based TRM program applied in an eye hospital and how does it affect 
the hospital’s safety culture?”  
 
Methods 
A mixture of methods was used (Bowling, 2002; Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2003). First, we have described the development and content 
of the TRM-program in detail. The case hospital is the only eye hospital in the Netherlands (thus serving 16 million people), 
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providing secondary eye care for the region and tertiary care for the country. As a major referral centre, it handles approxim ately 
140,000 outpatient visits and 14,000 surgical cases per year. Some 30 specialized ophthalmologists, 4 anaesthesiologists, and  4 
internists maintain their practices through a partnership with the hospital. The hospital, which has a total of 400 employees , 
operates resident and fellow programs and a research institute. All n=274 hospital staff involved in patient care were exposed to 
the TRM program. The training was mandatory for all staff but physicians. The numbers of staff types and respective participation 
rates are described in Table 1.   
 
> insert Table 1 about here 
 
We did observations during 8 multidisciplinary group meetings (medical and nursing staff, administrative staff, and aviation experts) 
where the program was developed. Discussions on content and process of the training were transcribed. We studied related 
documents (exercise material and assignments used during the sessions, minutes of the group meetings, hospital policy reports and 
announcements and safety related hospital protocols). Second, we performed assessments of the hospitals’ safety culture. Before 
the TRM-program was introduced (T0, January 2007), 19 semi-structured face-to-face interviews with ophthalmologists (5), 
anaesthesiologist (1), residents (3), nurses (5), administrative staff (3) and management (2) were held. The respondents were  
selected randomly, taking into account a representation from different functions and departments. The interviews were built 
around recent critical incidents using the critical incident technique (Flaganan, 1954) and the experiences of respondents and 
guided by a topic list based on the safety culture dimensions presented in the Background paragraph. Sample questions are 
‘Could you tell something about lesson from a recent incident? ’, ‘What did you do after the incident happened?’, ‘How often do 
you report errors?’, and ‘How do you experience your manager when you report an (near) incident?’. We have described details 
on the methodology of the interviews earlier in Van Dyck et al. (2013). After the TRM-program (T1, December 2009), 11 
interviews were conducted with ophthalmologists (3), residents (2), nurses (3) administrative staff (2) and a manager who also 
were interviewed at T0, using the same questions to observe differences after the introduction of the program.  
Third, we conducted unstructured observations during the program. At 24 TRM sessions, the reactions, behaviours and discussions 
were written down by a participating researcher. Additionally, unstructured observations were conducted during daily operational 
practice in the hospital since one of the participating researchers was also involved in the hospital as quality and safety consultant. 
In this action research approach, the researcher is an active project participant and supports the organization by analysing and 
implementing new methods. The researcher simultaneously and scientifically measures project results to extract general and 
generalizable knowledge (Eden & Huxham, 1996). To reduce the risk of bias, one other researcher (CD) was carrying out the 
majority of the interviews while two other researchers (JW and NK) provided independent peer review during the analysis. 
Additionally, a thorough member check was performed during different phases of the data collection and data analysis. During the 
program, 2 ophthalmologists, 2 nurses and 1 manager were interviewed about their experiences with the program. All interviews 
were a maximum of 1.5 hours and were transcribed verbatim. We structured and analyzed the content from the documents and 
the interviews according to tags drawn from the safety dimensions (see the list of tags mentioned above as related to the four 
safety culture dimensions, e.g. anticipation of approaching conditions, too rigid focus on prevention, etc .).  
 
Results 
 
Application of TRM 
Team Resource Management (TRM) was introduced in 2007 in the case hospital as part of a long term strategy of diffusing 
innovations from aviation (see de Korne et al., 2010). The reasons for launching TRM were repeated incidents with wrong-side eye 
surgeries (average of six per year in about 11,000 surgeries). The introduction of a time-out checklist before surgery in 2004 led to a 
serious improvement to zero or one incident a year, but its goal – zero wrong-side surgeries – was not met. Analysis of the incidents 
showed that the time-out checklist was not performed for all surgeries and that nurses had not always dared to speak up.   
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Aviation safety experts with experience in CRM training with flight crews were asked by the hospital board to develop a 
comparable TRM program for hospital staff. In close cooperation with a multidisciplinary group (medical and nursing staff, 
administrative staff, and aviation experts) a TRM program was developed. In accordance with aviation’s central CRM principles, the 
hospital wanted to increase communication and management skills by effective use of people and resources. The program had 
four elements: (1) safety audits of processes and (team) activities and feedback by aviation experts, (2) classroom training sessions 
and lectures on safety awareness and human factors by aviation experts, (3) a flight simulator session in Boeing 737-800 aircraft 
simulator with feedback on team performances, and (4) video recording of (team) activities and feedback by aviation experts (‘black 
box’). A cyclical approach is used by applying lessons and results of one element successively in the others (e.g., the video-
recordings are used during the classroom sessions).      
 
The first sessions started in 2007 with a pilot project at the ambulatory surgical centre and were mandatory for everyone but 
physicians. The TRM training was then provided on an on-going basis and extended to outpatient clinic teams. Participation in the 
training was embedded in the license agreement between ophthalmologists and the hospital. During the entire program, the 
aviation experts played an important role in design and co-creation. The aviation safety experts were viewed as credible by the 
participants, given the comparability between aviation/health care and cockpit/OR, and the fact that they did not occupy a position in 
medical hierarchy: “You take him seriously because he’s an expert from aviation, and therefore able to approach all the participants 
in the training – doctors and nurses – as if they were on the same level” (nurse 3). It helped to confront medical staff with 
comparable safety challenges and solutions in aviation because it is an industry they regard as interesting: “Both the cockpit and 
the OR are worlds of glamour” (manager 2).   
 
1. Safety audit. After an initial lecture on safety for the medical and administrative boards, aviation experts performed a safety audit 
of surgical care processes. During process walk-throughs, safety issues were recognized in prospective risk analysis and 
information about (recent) near incidents was gathered (retrospective analysis). The aviation experts used the ‘SHEL model of 
human factors’ to examine and elucidate the safety issues (Molloy & O’Boyle, 2005). The SHEL model is named after the initial 
letters of its components’ names Software (procedures, protocol, training), Hardware (machines, medical instruments), Environment 
(operating theatre, wards, consultation room, and Liveware (human factors: doctor, nurse, other health care professional or patient). 
This model was in particular useful where it argues that mismatches at the interface between its components (e.g. liveware – 
hardware) are often conducive to medical errors. Identified risks (see Table 2 for examples) were discussed with the multidisciplinary 
staff.  
 
>> insert Table 2 about here 
 
The results of the audits were incorporated in the materials for the classroom sessions and frequently showed the relevance of 
focusing on the whole patient process. Root causes of wrong-side surgery, for example, were often detected in parts of the 
logistical and administrative pre-operative processes.  
 
2. Classroom based training. The safety audit was followed by three four-hour interactive classroom sessions provided by aviation 
experts (Table 3).  
 
>> insert Table 3 about here 
 
Session 1 consisted of a presentation and discussion of the context of patient safety (human factors) and the consequences and 
necessary tools of teamwork (communication). Session 2 elaborated on (i) the theory and practice of situational awareness (being 
aware of surrounding actions to understand how information, events, and one’s own actions impact goals and objectives) and (ii) 
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decision making (with discussion of causes and appropriate reactions to faults and (un)acceptable risks). Session 3 addressed 
personality and (un)safe behaviour, leadership and accountability. All sessions made use of recent hospital cases (Figure 1). 
 
>> insert Figure 1 about here  
 
The classroom sessions were small-scale and highly interactive. Participants showed openness to each other related to their 
individual safety behaviour. For example, during an outpatient team session, an ophthalmologist – initially highly resistant to the 
program – showed increasing recognition of the relevance of open communication. During the first session, he refused to participate: 
“I’ll get involved in all this safety stuff only when organizational problems with capacity are solved.” In the next session, he sat 
just behind the inner circle but was involved in the discussion. In session three, he took a seat near the team and participa ted 
highly. During the session a nurse said that she sometimes felt intimidated when he yelled or cursed. He reacted: “Ladies, when I 
shout or curse, I’m basically angry with myself, not you.” We observed a literal sigh of relief in the training room. The nurse 
replied, “Dr.__, I’m so happy to hear you say this.” Later in an interview, the nurse indicated that this one event would have made 
the training worthwhile. The story is still being recounted among nurses in the hospital.  
 
3. Flight simulator session. A closing session took place in a Boeing 737-800 flight simulator, an new environment in which all staff 
was outside the regular hospital context and, moreover, the trainees could not fall back on their professional technical skills. The 
vast majority had never been in such environment and therefore the historical and classic medical hierarchy based on skills and 
experiences did not exist. Newly developed TRM skills were applied in an external, exciting environment that diminished common 
roles and hierarchy. The flight simulator was also used to ‘seduce’ physicians into the TRM program as it was obligatory to attend 
the classroom sessions before participation in the simulation session. 
 
4. Video feedback. Inspired by aviation, a ‘black box’ approach was introduced in 2008. The aviation safety experts videotaped 
ophthalmic surgeries monthly to give the team feedback on the application of the safety procedures taught during the classroom 
sessions. Adherence to protocols for the production, use, and distribution of the images was documented. The aviation black box is 
automated, but for financial constraints and juridical reasons the hospital used a handheld video recorder.  
Videotaping team activities were not easily accepted and fully-automated use has not yet been applied. Medical staff was 
initially hesitant, fearing that recorded unexpected outcomes could be used against them. Only ophthalmologists who participated in 
the TRM program and trusted the aviation safety experts consented to having their surgeries videotaped, but with the stipulation that 
the images be taken with a handycam and used solely for their own training. The chief ophthalmologist, who had declared his 
willingness in an earlier stage of the program, consented to make the recordings available to all the hospital’s attendings, residents, 
and nurses, stimulating others to get involved in the program. In the end, 75% of the ophthalmologists participated in the training. 
Top management was involved in developing and championing the TRM program throughout.  
 
Assessing the hospital’s safety culture 
 
1. Awareness of risks. From interviews and observations, it was clear that anticipation of approaching safety threats was a 
recurrent session topic. Participants talked about a lack of standards and interoperability and appealed for correction: “There are no 
strict protocols for what I do and what the surgeon does. Continuous evaluation and risk assessment depend on the surgeon” 
(resident 2). As a result of the discussions, multidisciplinary, standard operating procedures were agreed upon, including a pre-
operative briefing (with task division) and time-out. Situational awareness and the influence of individual human factors was a 
recurrent topic in the video feedback items (Table 4).  
 
>> insert Table 4 about here 
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The videotapes revealed team-specific differences in performing the time-out procedure and using the safety communication rules 
agreed on during the TRM training. They also showed that the absence of team members at the pre-operative briefing resulted in 
less structure and more communication gaps during surgery. As one aviation safety expert said, “It is a new and inspiring experience 
for ophthalmologists to see their own performance … within their environment. It confirms the notion that surgery is a team activity.” 
It was difficult to deny teamwork failures when they were clearly revealed on tape. One video showed how a lack of briefing resulted 
in uncertain behaviour of a resident and an unexpected pain movement of a locally-anesthetized patient. During a feedback session 
with staff, most ophthalmologists blamed the resident. The TRM trainer, however, confronted the ophthalmologist (captain) rather 
than the resident (co-pilot) with the situation and focused on a responsible leadership role.   
 
2. Aversion to error-reporting. Teams were convinced that eye surgery is highly unpredictable and most complications are not 
preventable. The trainer responded: “You’re talking about complications like we did in aviation 30 years ago. Bad weather, for 
instance, was called a complication. Today we say, no, weather conditions can be anticipated, so don’t call it a complication”. 
This seemed to create awareness and resulted in discussions about the differences between complications, medical errors, and 
adverse events. The number of reported near misses increased by about 300% (78 to 409) in the three years following the 
introduction of the TRM program. Some surgeons, however, indicated that reporting errors was still difficult. “You know that you’re 
not guilty or being blamed, but it still feels like it” (ophthalmologist 4).  
 Only 18% of the (near) incident reports over the past three years were submitted by ophthalmologists. Considering the 
one-to-one supervision model in which medical residents are trained, leading by example turned out to be a crucial factor 
influencing error reporting. “Basically you’re looking at the work practices of your supervisor and trying to copy that” (resident 1). 
Others indicated that they were highly dependent on the existing leadership culture. “You have to take the culture for granted; 
you know it’s part of the game when you want to become a specialist” (resident 3). During sessions, senior ophthalmologists 
claimed there were no barriers for residents to talk about errors. Residents did not agree: “I cannot comfortably report errors and 
concerns to my supervisor” (resident 1). As a result of the training, seniors and juniors openly discussed barriers.  
 
3. Social orientation. During the program, the risks of the monodisciplinary focus (both between ophthalmologists and 
anaesthesiologists and between physicians and other groups) and their own rules and behaviour were clearly demonstrated. An 
ophthalmologist spoke about the different worlds of surgery and anaesthesia: “I don’t see myself telling anaesthetists that they have 
to react to beeps of their equipment. That’s their responsibility” (ophthalmologist 4). The aviation expert, however, explained that 
each team member influenced patient outcomes. Respondents indicated that the training revealed basic communication 
(mis)understandings between professionals: “During medical training you only learn how to be a technically good ophthalmologist. 
You learn from your supervisor. I have never learned anything about team communication, other than from experience” 
(ophthalmologist 3). 
Before 2007, only monodisciplinary training was provided. The absence of multidisciplinary team meetings was seen by nurses 
as a deficiency since misunderstandings between the professions were common. The current TRM training partly filled the gap in 
creating a meeting and discussing platform. As one nurse said: “To be together with the multidisciplinary team is one of the greatest 
parts of this training. Usually, doctors and nurses are separately trained and talk about each other. Now we’re talking with each 
other” (nurse 2). Discussion of effective communication and the roles of personality and behaviour manifested especially in the later 
classroom sessions. Respondents indicated that the program had increased their awareness about their individual roles and its 
effects on the team. “Having final responsibility for the treatment of the patient, I am very happy with TRM training. Being together 
with all staff is good for reflection on the surgical process and the social relations between different people. And of cours e it’s 
also nice to operate once on a real flight simulator” (ophthalmologist 4). The flight simulator was used to increase awareness and 
social orientation as well as an incentive for physicians to become involved.  
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4. Mastery of risks. In the interviews, especially nurses indicated that they focused more on trying to learn from incidents because 
of TRM. To improve safety they now looked at the whole system for relevant changes instead of only the direct (near) incident 
causes, as shown in this example: “For a long time we tried to prevent having unexpected empty gas cylinders during surgery by 
not shifting nurses when a cylinder was almost empty, but it still happened frequently. As a result of the TRM, we have built  a 
system with an alarm on the gas cylinder that goes off when the cylinder is almost empty” (nurse 3). Starting in 2008, near 
misses and incidents were analysed on a department, instead of central level. (Near) incident reporting committees were 
installed for (1) surgical issues, (2) outpatients and (3) facilities and administration. The committees consist of an ophthalmologist 
(1 and 2) or facility manager (3) as chair, a nurse manager, and a safety consultant. All (near) incident reports are analysed and 
categorized on (estimated) frequency and severity. As a result, feedback and suggestions for action are provided to the 
reporters, involved professionals and departments, and (higher) management.   
Observations combined with interview data showed that employees are more critical about risks in their work, and have 
become aware that the ability to reduce or eliminate the likelihood of adverse events should be a shared, interdisciplinary 
responsibility. When the trainer asked during an early session whether the hospital was a safe place to work, many participants 
raised their hands. When asked the same question at the end of the session, the number of raised hands was substantially lower. 
Supportive actions for safety and (near) incident management were observed at all organizational levels. As part of the TRM 
program, various safety supporting actions were taken in the hospital (Table 5).  
 
>> insert Table 5 about here 
 
Safety officers, for example, became involved in incident analysis and top management began safety rounds. On the department 
level, every meeting started with safety topics, incidents, and near misses. Multidisciplinary standard operating procedures and 
safety instructions for patients were developed. Safety aspects were also added to existing internal quality audits. These 
observations indicate that the TRM program has resulted in an increasing application of (hospital-wide) safety-supporting 
practices.   
 
Discussion 
 
The TRM program was co-developed and implemented by healthcare professionals and aviation specialists. Aviation proved to be 
an inspiring example for medical professionals. The involvement of aviation specialists stimulated a broader perspective on safety 
issues without focusing too much on medical-technical details. Furthermore, the programs introduced the hospital’s first 
multidisciplinary platform and training. Observations showed that this helped participants to identify and change safety-related 
patterns of behaviour between professions, such as doctor-nurse and ophthalmologist-resident. The observations and interviews 
suggest that safety awareness has increased as a result of the training. Whether ophthalmologist’s compliance with the time-out 
procedure has increased is not yet evident, but a substantial decrease of wrong-site sentinel events due to using time-outs has been 
established (de Korne et al., 2010). Over the period 2010 to 2012, one incident per year was reported while number of reported 
near-misses increased to nine. Due to the duration as well as the design of this case study, we are not able to make distinct 
statements on a longer-term and sustainable culture change. 
 We recognize several limitations. The study was observational, and the hospital’s variety of efforts to improve safety culture 
prevented us from establishing a causal relationship between improvement and any one specific intervention. We tried to 
incorporate more quantitative outcomes from an internal hospital report. The hospital performed safety culture surveys (van Dyck, 
2000) in 2007 and an internal hospital report in 2009 (REH 2010). Due to response rates (53% and 38% respectively) and having 
only 22 paired respondents, no significant changes could be found. A second limitation is that a study in an eye hospital may not be 
generalizable to other hospitals. Other studies in different settings, however, have shown similar results (Rabøl et al., 2010; 
Catchpole et al., 2010). Third, we did not link changes in culture to patient outcomes other than wrong-side surgery. Relating the 
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visual acuity outcomes of cataract surgery to the hospital’s safety culture would have been useful and interesting, had data been 
available and reliable. 
Many authors have advocated the application of innovations from other industries in health care. Doing so, however, is not 
easy. One of the myths of medicine is that it readily adopts innovation. Balas et al. (1995) showed that, absent significant short term 
financial remuneration for practitioners or hospitals, implementing clinical studies in standard medical practices takes 17 years. 
Adopting new safety procedures could take even longer. According to Denham (2005) the strongest catalysts for change are new 
codes of remuneration for caregivers in computerized systems, which currently, and also in this study, are not closely related to 
patient safety. Incentives for innovation in the case hospital were related to its recent history. Back in the early 1990’s, the hospital in 
this study was at risk of being taken over by an academic hospital. The Dutch government would allow it to remain a stand-alone 
hospital if it achieved high production volumes, low costs, and a patient centered approach. Hospital management decided to try to 
learn from other industries by adopting several of their quality and safety methods. Implementation took place over a period of 
almost 20 years, during which the same CEO and CFO presided. The CEO (an MD) played an important role in championing the 
program and ‘selling’ it to the medical staff.     
Healthcare organizations, like accountancy and law, are professional and characterized by high levels of individual 
autonomy (Freidson 2001; Mintzberg 1983; Fulop, 2012). The nature of medical work, with its complexity and specific knowledge 
requirements can only partly be standardized. Because of medical autonomy, protocols in health care also carry a different weight 
compared to many other industries (e.g. Bogner, 1994). Medical professionals are often not held accountable and do not feel obliged 
to uphold protocols. Hospitals therefore lack the aviation industry’s strict system of registration and accountability for cases in which 
checks are not performed.  
The fact that hospitals are professional organizations seems to have implications for how they diffuse innovations. Our 
study showed that the diffusion of an innovation in eye hospitals takes more time and requires a longer-term perspective than other 
industries, and revealed many different influencing factors. Greenhalgh et al. (2005) have conceptualized a model for the spread and 
sustainability of innovations in service delivery and health organizations. In accordance with the earlier theory of Rogers (1995), they 
showed that diffusion is dependent on the characteristics of the innovation itself (and its resource system) as well as the ‘user 
system’ (with system antecedents and readiness for innovation, the adopter, assimilation, the implementation process) and its links 
to the outer context (socio-political climate, incentives and mandates, interorganizational norm-setting and networks).  
 The ‘user system’ is one of the most striking differences between industrial settings and hospital care. The most important 
resources (physicians) are not a formal part of the organization that acts as a threshold for the diffusion of changes. In our case 
study, physicians cooperate in partnership with the hospital, giving it few opportunities to require physician involvement in quality 
and safety initiatives. How organizational learning takes place in health care is very much influenced by the position of the physician 
and the relation between caregivers and others. Based on a study on the application of an aviation-based TRM training in 
neurosurgery and cardiac surgery, France et al. (2008) however indicate that health care TRM requires physician leadership that is 
supported by a broader organizational safety culture.  As shown in our study, teamwork is important for quality and safety 
improvements in health care; learning should be a collective process. Strong medical competences in combination with non-
technical skills and teamwork are highly important for effective work, productive relations, and realizing organizational improvements 
in high-reliability bodies such as hospitals (Argyris 1991; Baker et al. 2006; Van Stralen, 2008). Highly educated professionals are 
usually excellent in individual and single loop learning: they have had to learn to define and solve problems by themselves. Since 
they are good at their jobs, however, they rarely experience failure and usually react defensively or blame others when something 
goes wrong (Argyris 1991). Our observation where an ophthalmologist during the TRM classroom sessions confesses that he is 
basically angry with himself when shouting at the team resembles strongly with observations in an earlier study on the application of 
a comparable TRM approach in a pediatric intensive care unit: ‘if an attending physician yells or shows any other anger behavior, it 
reflects the physician’s fear and not the performance of the team’ (Van Stralen 2008, pp.83). Acknowledging and identifying failures 
is necessary for ‘double-loop learning’, which occurs when error is detected and corrected in ways that involve modifying the 
organization’s underlying norms, policies, and objectives (Argyris 2004). As observed in the case study, there is a difference 
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between individual and collective learning in teams. Our positive findings on the use of video feedback are in line with earlier studies 
that showed that its use stimulates discussion and augments learning of team behaviors (e.g. McConaughey, 2008). 
  Health care professionals seem to have a different view on teamwork than peers in other industries. Sexton et al. 
(2000) compared safety attitudes in aviation and hospitals, finding differences in team perception. The majority of (resident) 
surgeons had high scores on cooperation; anaesthesiologists’ and (surgical) nurses’ views were much lower. Surgical consultants 
agreed more often than pilots to statements such as “Even when fatigued, I perform effectively during critical times” (60% vs. 26%) 
and “My decision-making ability is as good in medical emergencies as in routine situations (76% vs. 64%). And Bracco et al. (2009) 
have clearly shown the risks of fatigue due to shift work on reaction time and tracking deviation and its consequences for incidents 
and errors in anaesthesiology. According to the authors, anaesthesia and aviation share the common theme ‘hours of boredom, 
minutes of thrill, and seconds of terror’. Despite medical specialists’ disavowal, stressors as fatigue can have a negative effect on 
surgical and medical performance. Physician participation in programs like TRM is important but was a challenge for hospital 
management and the industrial experts. The aviation experts observed that health care professionals had a different view of 
teamwork and much more autonomy than peers in others industries. Because hospital management could not formally demand 
medical specialists to participate, incentives were introduced. The flight simulator was also used to ‘seduce’ physicians into the 
TRM program. Hospital management and industrial experts did not succeed in introducing live recording of OR procedures 
because physicians feared legal implications. And, despite hospital policy that a time-out procedure be performed for every 
surgery, the analysis in the TRM sessions revealed that the procedure had not been carr ied out. As indicated by Van Stralen 
(2008), hospitals should also develop into high-reliability organizations with a strong focus on methods to support front-line 
caregivers and focus on self-efficacy (the belief that one can influence the outcome) and resilience (the use of resources on hand for 
problem-solving).   
The involvement of professionals from another industry proved very helpful in gaining the support of medical 
professionals and recruiting physician champions. Many physicians and other hospital  staff seemed to find aviation an 
acceptable model for comparison because they could identify with the highly educated pilots. Aviation experts were viewed as 
credible given the two industries’ risk similarities and the fact that aviation experts did not occupy positions in the medical 
hierarchy. The application of industrial methods can stimulate double-loop learning. The results of the TRM program showed that 
ophthalmologists and other hospital staff had become increasingly aware of safety issues. The multidisciplinary approach promoted 
social (team) orientation and thus learning. Professionals are disposed to focus on their own world. Mirroring with other industries 
stimulates critical views on one’s own work and simultaneously catalyzes the diffusion of innovations.  
Less recognized but progressively more apparent and demonstrated by these findings is that safety and quality improvements are 
not single treatment interventions but complex socio-technical interventions. During the program, many TRM aspects were related to 
organizational aspects outside the scope of the team, like the autonomous position of self-employed medical specialists. As stated, 
not all ophthalmologists participated in the program; hospital management had neither the position nor power to force them. 
Catchpole et al. (2010) measured the effect of aviation-style team training on three surgical teams from different specialties. They 
concluded that aviation-style teamwork training can increase compliance and team performance but that “the effect was reduced by 
significant latent failures in organizational and personal management factors such as the attitude and collaboration of key 
individuals”. The training is not always translated into sustained improvement in day-to-day care delivery. This failure to translate 
awareness into behaviour modification has been object of many studies. For instance, on hand hygiene we know that healthcare-
associated infections are considered to be the most frequent as well as the most preventable adverse events, however, the 
application of hand hygiene measures by health care workers has been deemed to be a complex phenomenon that is not easily 
explained or changed despite its simplicity (Haynes et al., 2009; Erasmus et al., 2011). 
Since safety and quality are relative concepts and has many stakeholders, trade-offs are made between related norms and 
values, and results vary with the individual and the context (Leistikov 2010). In a study on wrong-site surgery and surgical marking 
practices, Giles et al. (2006) found differences related to the sociology of medical profession and speciality, practical reasons for 
variations in marking practice, organizational variations, and variations arising from individual experience. Assessing the 
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organizational and social contexts in which interventions are successful, rather than trying to apply strict and artificial controls, is 
thus important to providing widely generalizable safety and quality improvement.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Aviation-based team resource management training (TRM) can be a useful approach to stimulating safety culture in hospitals. 
The TRM program consisted of safety audits, interactive classroom and flight simulator sessions, and video recording of team 
activities with subsequent feedback. Aviation experts were considered inspiring role models for medical professionals. They had an 
external perspective without hierarchical barriers or focus on medical-technical issues. Ophthalmologists and other hospital staff 
became progressively aware of safety issues. The multidisciplinary approach promoted social (team) orientation and diminished 
the former more functionally-oriented culture. The number of reported near-incidents strongly increased; the number of wrong-
side surgeries stabilized to a minimum after a substantial reduction in the first years after the program. A multidisciplinary system 
approach and focus on ‘team’ instead of ‘profession’ seems both necessary and difficult in hospital care.  
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Figure 1 Examples of cases used in the TRM program 
  
Case 1 Unjustified referral to sexually-transmitted diseases center 
In September 2007, a 22-year-old female visited the ophthalmic ER with complaints of an inflamed and irritated eye. The 
examining resident said things about conjunctivitis and Chlamydia. Microbes were send to the external lab. Upon the next visit, 
the results were not back, and so they were retrieved by telephone. The resident gave the patient the results and sent her, as 
protocol required, to the sexually transmitted diseases center for follow-up. (Such patients almost always also have genital 
Chlamydia.) Upon the third patient visit, the formal results were in the medical record: Chlamydia-negative. What went wrong? Did 
the resident write a false-positive result down? Was there verification by the microbiologist before the results were sent out? Were 
the wrong results read over the telephone? Were the wrong results heard? Were the wrong results noted? As a result of 
analyzing the process, positive results are now not given to the patient without written approval from the microbiologist. The 
medication is no different and a delay of two days has no relevant influence.        
Case 2 Wrong intraocular lens (IOL) power because of similar patient names  
In November 2008, two cataract patients with similar-sounding names were prepared for surgery at the ambulatory surgical 
center. Patient X was scheduled for surgeon A; patient Y was scheduled for surgeon B. By mistake, patient X was transferred to 
the OR of surgeon B, with the medical record of patient Y. Surgeon B implanted an IOL with the power of 18.5 diopter, as noted in 
the medical record while the patient needed a lens of 10.0 diopter. In meantime, a pre-op nurse noticed the error when performing 
an anesthetic time-out for patient Y. Operating surgeon B first resisted discussing the event, but was pressed by the chief 
executive of the hospital to cooperate. Analysis showed that the time-out procedure just before incision for patient X was not 
performed. There was no agreement in the operating team about definition and correct compliance of the time-out procedure. 
According to some, because a time-out is performed pre-op at the ambulatory surgical center it does not have to be repeated in 
the OR. Others talked about a ‘silent time-out’, a control moment without speaking. Also, two new team members had not 
received the TRM training and that morning the nurses had words about the distribution of tasks. As follow up, a transcript with 
detailed steps on ‘How to perform a time-out’ was constructed.       
Case 3 Wrong-side eye surgery for strabismus patient  
In August 2009, a 19-year-old female received surgery in the wrong eye. Neither the surgeon nor the pre- and post-operative 
nurses remarked on the event until the patient’s mother called the hospital that night. According to her, her daughter had pain in 
the unoperated eye. The surgeon was informed the next morning and realized that the surgery was done on the wrong eye. 
Analysis showed that the chain of events causing the event included: a change of CRNAs between intubations and surgery, 
unclear requirements for assisting residents, questions about the supervision of a new surgical nurse, and the lack of pre-op 
briefing. Because the event was revealed almost 24 hours later, it was difficult to reconstruct all the details. The situation 
stimulated using a video to capture team activities.   
Case 4 No patient chart for the macula degeneration patient 
Patient Jansen was scheduled for an Avastin-injection at the macular degeneration department by an ophthalmologist-resident. 
Due to administrative delays, no paper medical record was available. An OCT was performed based upon the partly filled 
electronic medical record, from which the most relevant details can be retrieved, e.g., which eye should be treated. To obtain 
permission from the ophthalmologist, the nurse wrote ‘patient Jansen, born 11/08/1938’ on a pad and went to the ophthalmologist 
to ask for signed permission to proceed. The ophthalmologist, however, was busy with another patient and refused to do so. He 
shouted, in front of patients: ‘You crazy nurse, please organize your chart management instead of bothering me with your 
problems.’ The nurse left and went ahead with the patient without formal permission from the ophthalmologist.       
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Table 1 TRM participation rates per staff type 
 
 
 
 
 
n 
(total) 
N 
(TRM) 
TRM 
participation 
rate 
ophthalmologists 28 21 75% 
anaesthesiologists 4 2 50% 
internists 4 2 50% 
residents  21 20 95% 
surgical nursing  36 34 94% 
anaesthetic assistants 18 17 94% 
nursing  37 35 95% 
outpatient allied health staff  68 65 96% 
administrative staff 58 56 97% 
 
274 252 92% 
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Table 2 Examples of found risks during safety surgical audit by aviation experts using the SHEL 
model  
L-H negative L-H positive L-S negative  L-S positive 
1. Emergency button of 
microscope is too 
easily touched  
2. Unfixed microscope 
wire on the ground is 
regularly touched by 
wheel of surgical chair. 
3. Suture wires with 
unclear thickness 
4. Unclear or illegible 
handwriting 
5. No place to put 
medical record close to 
surgeon 
6. Unclear transport 
policy of medical 
gasses during surgery   
7. Room temperature too 
high or too low 
8. Sound of radio 
interferes with sound of 
phacoemulsification. 
9. Culture differences 
between professional 
groups 
10. Work pressure due to 
planning of patients 
11. Scarce ICT available 
 
1. Good validity of medical 
equipment 
2. Sufficient light  
3. Modern anaesthesia 
equipment 
4. Enough workspace 
5. Sufficiently trained 
employees 
6. Little hierarchical 
difference between 
professions 
7. Much attention to patient 
safety in the hospital 
1. No nursing protocol 
for new treatments 
2. Complex control of 
anaesthesia 
equipment 
3. No standard field for 
drop anaesthesia in 
medical record.  
4. Time out is not 
performed in a 
standard way. 
5. Presence of observers 
give change in 
procedures 
6. No hand-off between 
ophthalmologist and 
nurses 
7. High authority 
gradient between 
anaesthesiologist and 
CRNA 
1. Many protocols 
provided 
2. Time-out protocol is 
available and used 
3. Proper hand-off 
between CRNAs 
4. Mutual team check 
cornea size 
5. Intentions of surgeon 
are passed to CRNA 
6. Proper authority 
gradient between 
surgeon and team 
 
 
SHEL: Software, Hardware, Environment, Liveware;  
L-H: lifeware – hardware connection;  
L-S: lifeware – software connection    
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Table 3 Content of classroom sessions in the TRM program 
Session 1 
Organization 
- Introduction to TRM  
- Statistics and examples of human factor failures 
- Primary causes of incidents  
- Recognizing errors using human factors theory and SHEL-Model 
(software, hardware, environment, lifeware) (Molloy & O’Boyle, 2005) 
- Threat and error management 
- Swiss cheese model and actions to reduce the likelihood of error 
(Reason, 1990) 
- Information processing 
- Situational awareness in decision making (1) 
Session 2 
Team 
- Situational awareness in decision making (2) 
- Effective communication and coordination 
- TRM loop: Inquiry →  advocacy  →  conflict resolution → decision making   
- Leadership and teamwork  
- Situational leadership 
- Relation- and task-focused 
- Feedback:  push and pull styles 
- Push and pull styles of communication for leaders 
- Team exercises 
- Personality and  behaviour (1) 
Session 3 
Individual 
- Personality and behaviour (2) 
- Hazardous attitudes  
- How to beat hazardous attitudes 
- Personality   
- Feedback: theory and exercises  
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Table 4 Examples of video observations and feedback to surgical team 
 
Item Observation Feedback 
 
Mental preparation Before the patient was on the operating table, 
who (attending or resident) was supposed to 
perform the surgery had not been agreed on. 
 
The performing surgeon is not able to prepare 
mentally and obtain situational awareness. 
 
Briefing After the patient arrived in the operating room, 
a resident and student received a medical-
technical explanation about the procedure. 
There was no talk about who would be 
performing what actions or potential problems. 
As it turned out, the resident was prepared to 
do so. 
 
A “captain” needs to have situational 
awareness regarding the competencies of the 
colleague performing the operation. To 
prevent such errors, he or she briefs him 
before on what to expect, so the situational 
awareness of the “co-pilot” is updated. The co-
pilot can ask questions or be asked to jump in 
during the surgery. This was not made clear to 
the team. 
 
Projection The ophthalmologist discussed the surgical 
schedule for the day and indicated that the first 
surgery in the afternoon was expected to last 
2.5 hours. He asked the team to plan their 
lunch time accordingly. 
 
This is a good example of correct projection of 
tasks and managing of resources. 
 
 
Time-Out The time-out was performed, but there was no  
check against the information in the medical 
chart. 
How can we ensure that the time-out 
procedure is performed in a standard manner? 
 
 
New instrument Halfway during surgery, a scalpel with new tip 
was on the surgical table. The surgeons did 
not know why. 
The fact that surgeons did not know about the 
new tip can be observed as a “threat” from the 
organization. Are the communication 
procedures from the organization to surgeons 
sufficient, and did the team take responsibility 
and sufficient measures to prevent errors from 
such threats? 
 
Communication The surgeon asks for an intraocular lens (IOL) 
and the circulating nurse gets one. Before 
putting it on the table, she says “20” but did 
not receive a response from the surgeon. After 
a while, the surgeon asks to see the chart to 
check the IOL power. 
 
When the IOL is unpacked, it was shown to be 
the wrong one. Why not close the 
communication loop before unpacking the IOL 
or implement a check moment before? 
 
 
Communication Frequently, a task or some material is 
required, but is not repeated in a standardized 
manner to confirm that it is understood. 
Communication at surgery is limited (e.g., 
covered face, working hands, not looking at 
each other), which every team member should 
be aware of and try to compensate for. Closing 
the communication loop during handovers 
(repeating an assignment, saying “check” or 
“yes”) seems useful. 
 
Assertiveness As the ophthalmologist prepared to wash the 
eye, the circulating nurse asked if the right 
method and material were used. 
 
The circulating nurse’s assertiveness was 
perfect, as was the reaction of the 
ophthalmologist. 
 
 
 
  
Type footer information here 
Type header information here 
 
Table 5 Observations on safety issues before and after the TRM program in the case hospital 
Before After 
Paper-based incident report system 
 
Online (near)incident reporting system 
Central hospital incident committee Three decentralized safety committees for surgical, 
outpatient and facility (near) incidents. Based on risk 
estimation, reports are send to central committee 
Incident investigation done by managers  Incident investigation done by safety officers and (when 
necessary) the independent chair. 
Internal quality audits 
 
Internal quality & safety audits  
Protocols focused on department level  Protocols developing to process focused standard 
operation procedures 
 
No safety rounds  Safety rounds by CEO, Chief of Surgery, Pharmacist, 
Nurse, Technical Officer, Safety Officer 
Safety was on the agenda when incidents occurred   Every meeting starts with, ‘Are there any concerns about 
safety?’ 
 
Time-out before surgery 
 
Time-out including briefing before and debriefing after 
surgery 
 
No formal risk evaluation during performances ‘Safety eye’ used by teams to determine risks and 
stimulate professionals to speak up.  
 
Monodisciplinary protocols on medical gasses   Multidisciplinary standard operating procedure on logistics 
of medical gasses and liquids 
General protocol for intraocular lenses logistics  
 
Specific protocol for extraordinary intraocular lenses 
No safety instructions for patients  
 
Safety instructions for patients on website and in paper 
flyers 
 
 
 
 
